Like Jessica Chen Wise, Jude Blanchette, Chair China Studies at the Centre for Strategic and International studies, China is likely to continue considering that the costs of attacking Taiwan would be too great. He thinks the best solution for maintaining peace in the Taiwan strait is no solution- that is maintenance of the status quo. He writes:
“Unilaterally risking a war with the United States over Taiwan would not mesh with Xi’s grand strategy… to restore China as a leading power on the world stage and to transform China into, as he puts it, a “modern socialist nation.” The imperatives of seizing Taiwan on the one hand and asserting global leadership on the other are thus in direct tension. Any conflict over Taiwan would be catastrophic for China’s future…Invading Taiwan would jeopardize Beijing’s access to global finance, data, and markets—ruinous for a country dependent on imports of oil, food, and semiconductors.
Beijing would likely face unprecedented diplomatic blowback and sanctions. Conflict just off China’s eastern shoreline would incapacitate one of the world’s busiest maritime corridors, bringing with it disastrous consequences for China’s own export-driven economy. And of course, by invading Taiwan, China would be inviting military engagement with the United States and perhaps other regional powers, including Japan. This would be the very definition of a Pyrrhic victory.
These realities deter China from actively considering an invasion. Xi, like all his predecessors, wants to be the leader who finally annexes Taiwan. But for more than 70 years, Beijing has concluded that the cost of an invasion remains too high…
None of Xi’s speeches resemble the menacing ones that Russian President Vladimir Putin gave in the run-up to his invasion of Ukraine. It is impossible to rule out the chance that Xi might miscalculate or blunder into a conflict. But his statements and behaviour do not indicate that he would act so recklessly.
Military decisions must not be allowed to define the United States’ overall approach, as many analysts and policymakers are effectively suggesting they should. The inescapable reality is that no additional increment of U.S. military power that is deployable in the next five years will fundamentally alter the military balance. The United States must rely on statecraft and a broader array of tools to make clear to Beijing the high price of using force to compel unification.
The ultimate goal of a sustainable Taiwan policy should be to preserve peace and stability, with a focus on elongating Beijing’s time horizon such that it sees unification as a “someday” scenario. The United States must especially avoid backing Xi into a corner, preventing a situation in which he no longer treats Taiwan as a long-term objective but as an impending crisis. This different approach would entail an uncomfortable shift in mindset for many analysts and policymakers, who see the United States and China as locked in an inevitable showdown and view any consideration of Beijing’s sensitivities to be a dangerous concession.”